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CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Historical Background
A study of the risk for Genocide
by Peter Stridsberg
Published with permission of Peter Stridsberg

Preface

We’re frightened by the possibility of a future genocide in Côte d’Ivoire. The aim of this report is to share our fears with you in the most serious and easily comprehensible way that is in our power. We will start with a political history of the country and continue with different models of understanding and predicting genocide, evaluating the history and situation in Côte d’Ivoire with respect to the models as we go. In order to make it easier to follow the evaluations, bolded key-words for the models are inserted into the historical section within parenthesises (key-word).

Political History

In 1960, Felix Houphoüet-Boigny, leader of Ivory Coast’s democratic party (PDCI), declared his country’s independence from France.  Rising prices on raw materials boosted the economy and the people of Ivory Coast could benefit from comparably high standards of living. PDCI remained the only allowed party in the country until 1990.

Formally, the ethnic groups of Ivory Coast were equal, but in practice the president’s baulé ethnicity was given preferential treatment. The wave of democracy following the fall of the communist dictatorships in Eastern Europe at the end of the 80s, and an economic crisis 1989-90 forced Houphoüet-Boigny to give to demands for a multi-party system. The opposition leader Laurent Gbagbo, head of the Ivorian People’s Front (FPI) ran against Houphoüet-Boigny in the semi-free election of 1990 but only managed to get around 20% of the votes. The socialist and increasingly nationalistic FPI organised in 1991 violent protests against the reform program intended to resolve the economic crisis. Unemployed youth from the cities started to return to the countryside, just to find the land they hoped to cultivate was used by others – “immigrants” from the northern parts of the country, but also from Burkina Faso and from other West African countries. Xenophobic ideas began to take root[1]. Houphoüet-Boigny had in a famous speech declared that the land belongs to those who cultivate it and people had poured to the southern parts[2] of the country where the soil is well-suited for coffee and cocoa plantations.

The death of Houphoüet-Boigny in December 1993 set off a power struggle between Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara and the speaker of the parliament Henri Konan Bedié. The latter had secured support within the Baulé hierarchy, the parliament, the government, and to some extent also by France, and was appointed president[3]. Ouattara moved abroad to become Deputy Managing Director of the IMF in Washington. His supporters were removed from important positions, to be replaced by people close to Bedié[4]. Several journalists critical of the regime were jailed. In the prelude of the 1995 elections Bedié fuelled the nationalistic currents and launched a policy based on ivoirité – a term that separates “real” Ivorians from those with a “mixed” background (ethnicism). In practice being of the northern, Muslim, ethnic groups were enough to fail qualifying as a real Ivorian[5]. Numerous foreigners were now forced to leave the country and all northerners were removed from government offices (ethnic discrimination and cleansing). A new electoral law was adopted which prohibited citizens of “mixed” background to be candidates in the presidential election (ethnicism). The law was aimed against Ouattara who was barred from the 1995 presidential elections on false claims of having a father from Burkina Faso[6].  Bedié won the 1995 elections in a landslide, but many citizens did not vote upon calls for boycott from Gbagbo, Ouattara and others.

 The elections spurred increased tensions between ethnic groups. Rumours of a coup d’état surfaced resulting in the sacking of army commander Robert Gueï[7]. Several public expressions of discontent with the government took place in 1998 and 1999 including demonstrations organised by students and civil servants. In this atmosphere, the army under the lead of General Gueï took power in a coup on 24 December 1999 (upheaval). Bedié fled abroad and Gueï took over the lead of the country.

 Gueï promised to establish democracy and held presidential elections in October 2000, in accordance with the constitution. However, by reason of the ivoirité argument he allowed only 5 out of 19 potential candidates to run (Ouattara and Bedié were excluded). Gueï surely expected to win. When preliminary results showed that Gbagbo would get a majority of the votes, Gueï arrested the officers of the electoral commission and proclaimed himself as the winner of the elections. This led to a popular revolt where tens of thousands demonstrators backed by parts of the police and the army overthrew Gueï and propelled Gbagbo to power (upheaval).

 Gueï had continued the discriminatory policies of Bedié. For example, in the days before he was overthrown, he sorted out all Dioulas in the presidential guard and put them in an extremely small prison where they were tortured every day. Many died (ethnic killings). The event would surely still be a secret if Gueï hadn’t been overthrown during these days.

October 2000 - Gbagbo in power

Gbagbo refused to call for new elections and supporters of Ouattara’s party, Rally of Republicans (RDR), returned to the streets, this time to march against Gbagbo. Many clashes between RDR and FPI supporters took place until Gbagbo could disperse the RDR supporters with security forces. About 200 supporters of the opposition[8] died before Gbagbo had control over the situation (upheaval).

 Ethnic-motivated violence flared up at the same time and affected Dioulas. The Dioula is a loosely defined northern ethnic group, and Dioula is often used as a catch-all term for northerners, Muslims and West African immigrants in Ivory Coast. A mass grave with 57 bodies from the ethnically motivated killings of 2000 was found in the Yopougon district of Abidjan. A survivor recount that Dioulas were dragged out of their homes to be massacrated (ethnic killings)[9].

 The issue of national identity became especially infected under Gbagbo rule. During the Houphoüet-Boigny reign, many Ivorians hadn’t seen any major reason to become Ivorian citizens formally. All this changed when a new law was introduced in 1998 making citizenship a precondition to own land. Ivorians with northern names and foreigners have since the mid 90s, and especially after the fall of Gueï in 2000, become victims of systematic abuses and discrimination. It is very difficult for northerners in the south to obtain citizenship (ethnic discrimination)[10].

 The situation seemed to improve slightly in 2001 with the successful implementation of free municipal elections in which RDR won the most seats. A reconciliation conference was held where Gbagbo, Bedié, Gueï and Ouattara agreed to make security forces more professional, to create a strong national electoral commission, to deal with the sensitive issue of land ownership and to oppose undemocratic roads to power[11]. However, the issues of residence permits and citizenship for foreigners remained far from solved[12]. During the reconciliation process Gbagbo continued to remove individuals in the army and the administration, judged not to be loyal to him partly on ethnic grounds, and replaced them with his supporters (ethnic discrimination)[13].

 September 2002 – A rebellion divides the country

Existing discontent in the army increased in September 2002 when Gbagbo attempted to demobilise or retire 700 soldiers. Plans for a military coup had by this time been finalised by a group of former soldiers who had been close to Gueï, but lost influence and sought refuge in Burkina Faso when Gueï increasingly sought power for himself[14].  The coup attempt was executed on 19 September 2002 and turned into a civil war as the initial strikes failed in Abidjan, but succeeded in Bouaké and Korhogo. The rebels seemed in the beginning to have the overhand in the war, but French and West African peace-keepers managed to halt their advance and create a ceasefire by the end of 2002. The northern half of the country was now in the hands of the rebels (upheaval). Eventually France managed to bring the parties to the negotiating table in Linas-Marcoussis 15-25 January 2003, and a peace treaty was signed[15]. 

 Following the September coup the Ivorian security forces, reportedly sometimes accompanied by young armed men in plain clothes, began an assault on various neighbourhoods, allegedly to seek out those who had launched the attack and their supporters. What ostensibly started as a security operation immediately degenerated into a serious pattern of human rights violations, accompanied by excessive force, extortion, arbitrary arrests and destruction of property with the consequent mass dislocation of vast numbers of inhabitants of Abidjan. The Ivorian Red Cross estimated that between September 21 and 24, some 12,000 people were displaced from ten neighbourhoods in Abidjan. Of these people, an estimated 80 percent were foreigners (ethnic cleansing). A further eight neighbourhoods were designated for destruction but had not been visited by the inter-agency rapid assessment mission that made this estimate[16]. In October, governmental forces also killed dozens of people with Muslim (and thus northern) names in Daloa (ethnic killings)[17]. Numerous night-time killings and disappearances attributed to death squads close to the presidency targeted opposition members or family members of rebel leaders (death squads)[18]. All in all, a veritable reign of terror against northerners, immigrants and opposition were in effect in Abidjan during the first 7 months after the coup[19].

 Paramilitary supporters of Gbagbo in the form of different militia groups for “patriotic defence” appeared soon after the coup attempt. These groups have organised violent riots and committed abuses with total impunity against people with northern-sounding names and against members of the democratic opposition. The more extreme militia groups advocate cleaning the country from “immigrants” (ethnicism). For example, in 2003 Charles Groguhet was the leader of the Groupement Patriotique pour la paix (GPP). GPP was organized into companies of 500 to 700 head-shaved youths, each group with its own distinctive t-shirt and name. In Abidjan alone, GPP was estimated to have 6000 members, whereof 90% of southern origin and 80% of president Gbagbos ethnic Beté group. In an interview to the Ivorian newspaper Soir Info Charles Groguhet declare the intentions and viewpoint of GPP in this way[20]:

“National reconciliation is not going to happen with these divisive accords, you can count on me. All these RDR and MPCI ministers who are around Gbagbo are looking to kill him to finally take power. We’re going to liberate Côte d’Ivoire; we want to tear Côte d’Ivoire away from the sons of immigrants who want to take everything away from the Ivorians. We know that it’s Alassane Dramane Ouattara, that son of immigrants, who opened the door of Côte d’Ivoire to his foreign brothers to invade us. […] The GPP has relations with senior military officers, we confirm it. We will not allow our country, full of strong youths, to accept the new form of colonisation that France wants to impose on us. […] We aren’t fighting for a political party, even less for an individual, even if he is the president of the republic; we’re fighting to clean Côte d’Ivoire of its sons of immigrants and their spokesman, Alassane Dramane Ouattara.”

 The term immigrant refers in practice also to the northern ethnic groups which share names and their Muslim faith with the immigrants from Burkina Faso. ICG gives the name of 23 different militia groups among which the largest have several thousand members[21]. Totally, it has been estimated that the militias have around 150 000 members[22]. The militias are trained by the security forces, obtain weapons from state authorities and are relatively disciplined with hierarchies leading to president Gbagbo (racist militia)[23].

 The militias have protested violently against any concessions to the peace process. They have attacked French civilians, French property and symbolic establishment such as the French Cultural Centre when France has promoted the Linas-Marcoussis peace treaty[24]. Perhaps most notably, on the very day of the signing of the peace accords, Gbagbo gave instructions to the militia leaders to carry out violent anti-French demonstrations in protest. As a result, some 8000 French nationals left the country at this time[25] (organized violence). The opposition is even more exposed to the rage of the pro-government militia. A planned demonstration on 25 March 2004 was brutally crushed by the militia which in cooperation with the security forces killed at least 120 persons (upheaval). Not only demonstrators were killed. Individuals in the opposition had been targeted on beforehand, and when the day of the demonstration arrived, security forces and militias broke into their homes, kidnapped and executed them (assassinations). Also, Muslims, immigrants and people from the north were killed in a way that had little or nothing to do with the march (ethnic killings)[26].

 Hate rhetoric is commonplace in the south. State controlled media as well as media close to FPI and the militias are guilty of inciting ethnic hatred and violence[27]. The hate press speak of the foreigners as a problem for the country and suggest for example that the genocidal killings in the country’s history (such as the mass grave of Youpogon with 57 dead) are simply a plot by the RDR[28]. Interviews with war mongerers such as militia leaders (for example the one quoted above) and the extreme nationalist wing of FPI are also common (hate-rhetoric).

 Members of the FPI, government representatives, and people suspected to be siding with Gbagbo were attacked on rebel-controlled territory during the civil war. After the end of the armed conflict there have been many reported cases of rape, armed robberies and plunder[29]. The rebel movement have had problems with internal hostilities between leading figures of the rebellion[30]. 

 Gbagbo and the rebels have in the Linas-Marcoussis peace treaty committed to hand over power to a reconciliatory government before the disarmament of rebels. Gbagbo has, however, in practice given very little power to the ministers that have been appointed by the opposition and the rebels[31]. The Gbagbo regime has during the peace process greatly increased military spending recruiting mercenaries and buying combat aircraft, helicopters, artillery and tanks (arming)[32]. The rearmament and training of militias combined with the refusal of implementing the fundamental parts of the peace treaty despite many promises and negotiations, gives the impression that Gbagbo is trying to gain time[33]. The poorer and less politically stable north gets weaker compared to Gbagbos south[34] with the passing of time, strengthening Gbagbos negotiating position and his ability to take up arms.

 Already back in 1999, some 12,000 foreigners in the western part of the country were driven away from their land by local militia groups (ethnic cleansing). Several hundred foreigners – most of which from Burkina Faso – were killed in the process (ethnic killings). The perpetrators made claims on the land the immigrants had been using for many years, saying that their ancestors had used the same land. The government created an atmosphere of impunity by overlooking the serious crimes committed. The concept of ivoirité provided ideological legitimacy (ethnicism)[35].  These events continued in 2002-2004 when local militias, sometimes backed by security forces, forced thousands of immigrants away from their lands in the west and southwest of the country, killing some in the process (ethnic cleansing and killing). Hardly anyone was brought to justice for these deeds[36].

 500,000 immigrants are estimated to have returned to their native countries, and another 750,000 have fled from their homes due to the civil war[37]. This massive exodus is of course partly a result of people fleeing away from imminent fighting, but also a result of fear of future ethnic violence and of foreigners being forced from their land (upheaval). 

November 2004 – government attempt to restart the war

The governmental army started aerial attacks on rebel-held territory on 4 November 2004. All opposition-friendly newspapers were officially banned, and the pro-government militia looted, vandalised and/or burned the offices of the main opposition newspapers. The headquarter of RDR were ransacked and set o­n fire by the same militias. The other main opposition party PDCI had it’s headquarter attacked and vandalised. [38]

 Two advancing contingents of military vehicles were stopped from passing the zone of confidence between north and south by UN forces[39]. Homes of opposition politicians and of northerners were set on fire, and the militia has assassinated at least five northerners and immigrants (ethnic killings)[40]. The aerial bombardments of rebel positions persisted the 5^th and the 6^th November, when French forces were bombed. France retaliated by eliminating the offending aircrafts and most of the governmental air force[41]. The Gbagbo regime’s response was to incite anti-French sentiments through state controlled media and call the militia to take the streets to defend against alleged French plans of a coup d’état (hate-rhetoric). Four days after the start of the bombardments Gbagbo spoke to calm down the situation in the streets, while state media continued to broadcast calls to riot[42]. The anti-French and anti-Western riots continued and resulted in some cases of rape, physical abuse as well as massive destruction of schools, small businesses and private homes[43] (organized violence). Many countries evacuated their citizens.

The risk for genocide in the country

Introduction

 Côte d’Ivoire has been described as a xenophobic bomb ready to explode. Xenophobic media has grown strong, there are numerous racist militia groups (see racist militia), and several racially motivated assaults with dozens or hundreds killed have occurred during the last years (see ethnic killings).  This has led observers to fear that the country is dangerously close to genocide. The Belgian sociologist Benoît Scheuer made the film “Ivory Coast – an explosive identity crisis” in 2001 that warns for a possible genocide. Genocide Watch claimed at the time of the attempted coup 2002 that the country was in phase 6 in their model of the process to genocide; phase 6 is preparation of genocide and phase 7 is execution[44]. The opposition-friendly newspaper Le Patriote published 2004 an article with the title “Ivory Coast 2004 – The Construction of a Genocide” [45] comparing the Ivorian situation with that of Rwanda ten years earlier. On the other hand, there are well-respected observers that consider the situation to be more like a potential Liberia where different warlords try to take possession of the country’s wealth, rather than Rwanda in 1994[46].

 The risk however seems real enough to motivate a closer investigation. The following investigation is comprised of 3 studies, beginning with a case study of Côte d’Ivoire from the point of view of a sociological analysis of genocide as a process in study 1; an analysis of risk factors in study 2; and a comparison between ignored early warning signals from Rwanda 90-94 and signals from Côte d’Ivoire today in study 3.

Study 1 – Genocide as a Process

A sociological approach to understanding genocide sees it as a process a society goes through. The Belgian Sociologist and secretary general for the institute Prevention Genocides conducted a study in 2001. We will present a brief overview of his study and a discussion of how the situation has changed since then.

Rapid changes – “Who am I”?

The process started with rapid negative changes for the population during the late 1980's and early 1990's. Falling prices on cocoa and coffee led to unemployment. This together with some other changes such as the death of the country’s dictator since the previous 33 years and generally the enlargement of the known world that came with the increasing information flow from the outer world led to a sense of lost or uncertain identity for many[47].

 This raised a frightening question within people – how can I preserve my identity, my culture and my traditions in this new world? Who am I?

Struggle for power – “I’m an Ivorian!” 

The next phase came with the power struggle after Houphoüet-Boignys death in 1993. Bedié invented the concept of ivoirité to exclude Ouattara from the upcoming elections of 1995 on basis of him not being Ivorian. The governmental media din the ivoirité concept into the heads of Ivorians during 1994. The basic idea is simple: Côte d’Ivoire for the Ivorians. Ivorian is being roughly defined as a person with the right name, from the right ethnicity.

 This idea gave people a possible answer to the question of their identity. Who am I? I’m an Ivorian!

Misrepresentation of history – “Why am I afraid?”

In the next phase, history is being manipulated. The northern Ivorians are said to have been invading the country, rather than migrating to it (these migrations took place many hundred years ago, not to be confused with the more recent migration of todays ”immigrants”). The immigrants are said to enter the country to live a good living on Ivorian social benefits, costing the society huge amounts of money and constituting a social problem. In actual fact, the immigrants were invited during the reign of Houphoüet-Boigny to work in the country. Also, immigration is said to increase. Articles in the pro-ivoirité press speak of 40-45% of the population consisting of immigrants. In reality, the census of 1988 numbers the immigrants to 28% and the census of 1998 to 26% of the population[48].

 Believing now that ivoirité might be the solution to the frightening identity question, people continue with asking themselves: “Why am I afraid?” At this point, they have only a vague feeling that the immigrants are to blame.

Victimization of Ivorians – “Because the foreigners are a threat!”

Increasingly, immigrants are seen as a threat. In the press, stories of evil immigrants prevail. For example, immigrants from Mali are said to kill a few Ivorians every night in a community because they were trying to become fishermen. Also, Ivorians are seen as victims of the large Muslim population in the country. The argument goes that the Muslims already have the economic power of the country and that it would be lethal for Ivorians to allow them to political power as well.

 The scapegoat solution presented to people at this stage is very easy for people to accept; “my problems and my fear are not my fault, it’s the foreigners who pose a real threat to me”. 

We and Them – “It’s either us or them”

As most immigrants come from the northern neighbouring countries, are of the same tribes as the northerners and are Muslim, the enemy is seen as this confused group of enemies. The members of RDR are also seen as a part of this enemy as they are trying to reverse the process and as they have strong support among the “enemy” group. For example, if a politician with a previously accepted race but with the wrong type of name starts to lean towards the RDR he or she will soon find that her background is no longer accepted. 

 Now, the foreigners are seen as a threat to people and they recognize that many others feel like them. The world is increasingly seen as a struggle between “us” and “them” and this polarization is easily seen as a total conflict where there is space for only one the kinds: “It’s either us or them”.

Stereotypes and Animalization – “We are allowed to eliminate them”

When the enemy group has been identified they start to be described as devils, tumours, rats and other harmful animals in the press.

 Now, people have accepted the thought that they have an enemy that must be encountered. However, heavy guilt accompanies the thought of killing the enemy as people knows the enemy consists of feeling human beings. Thus, in order to encounter the enemy this guilt must be avoided and the enemy be thought of as animals, devils or objects that you may kill and destroy without guilt: “We are allowed to eliminate them”.

Discriminatory laws are created

Laws hindering the enemy group from influence are created. For example, Ivorian citizenship became required to own land in 1998 (including in some cases already owned land) and a new constitution were passed in 1999 regulating that both parents of a potential candidate must be Ivorian for a person to be elected president.

Ethnic violence

A society that has gone through these previous steps is ready for ethnic violence. Côte d’Ivoire reached this state around 1999 and has experienced several cases of ethnical violence (see ethnic cleansing and ethnic killings). Genocide might thus start at any time if the fuse is ignited (see discussion).

Discussion on study 1

At first, it might seem that someone who warned for genocide some 3-4 years ago obviously was wrong and that it is not an important matter today. However, the warning signals shouldn’t be seen as warning for an immediate genocide. Instead, the process creates a political environment where genocide is a possible development. In fact, these warning signals were present in Nazi Germany in the mid 1930's – the genocide started in 39-41 (depending on definitions), in Rwanda from 1990 or so – the genocide started in 1994. A closer look instead reveals that the situation has in fact deteriorated since 2001.

 First, the armed rebellion supported by Burkina Faso and the division of the country gives new credibility to the propaganda that the foreigners are a threat to the Ivorians. In fact, the Burundian genocide of Hutu was an important contributing factor to the Rwandan genocide of Tutsi. The logic is this: If we don’t kill them first – they will kill us.

 Second, the creation of a possible group of perpetrators, namely the strong militias (see racist militia), has occurred during these years. The leaders of these groups have everything to lose on a peaceful future[49]. Today, they are respected and have power – in a peaceful tomorrow, they have nothing and are perhaps in prison for their deeds. In Rwanda, the interahamwe militia violently opposed every politician favouring the Arusha peace accords. Finally, they killed “their” president and started the genocide. Such a development is possible, although by no means inevitable, in Côte d’Ivoire.

 Third, the “lesser” violent incidents that are actually occurring changes people, making genocide more likely. The Encyclopedia of Genocide explains this in the following way[50]:

 “As the group or its members begin to harm the scapegoat or ideological enemy, they begin to change. As they persecute, abuse, torture or kill, individuals and groups ‘learn by doing.’ They change as the result of their own actions and become more committed to violence. […] The increasing violence against victims is made more likely by the passivity of internal and external bystanders. They tend to remain passive and they too change as they do so. They distance themselves form the victims, often by justifying the violence against them. The passivity of bystanders affirms the perpetrators.”

Study 2 – Analysis of Risk Factors

Perhaps the most successful genocide early warning system so far was presented at the Stockholm International Forum 2004[51]. The model presented[52] successfully predicted 79% of historical genocides based on a risk factor analysis. The model first identifies that genocides nearly always occur in the wake of other kinds of state failure (only one of the 36 genocides and politicides[53] identified as beginning between 1955 and 1998 occurred in a country that was not already experiencing some kind of state failure). Due to lack of statistical resources we will discuss the presence of the model risk indicators in Côte d’Ivoire in the way presented at the forum. At the forum each indicator was considered to be triggered (“yes”) or not (“no”). The countries at risk could then be compared to each other by means of how many of the six indicators that were triggered (“yes”). By comparing with the risk countries presented at the forum we can investigate each indicator to see if it is triggered by Côte d’Ivoire or not.

I - Regime Type (Yes)

The more autocratic the regime, the more likely genocide is to occur. Autocratic governments generally have less ways to deal peacefully with challenges and are more prone to use violence to solve conflict.

 The current dictator in Côte d’Ivoire did come to power through elections in 2000 but the elections were severely flawed, banning 14 of 19 candidates from running for the presidency. The regime severely hinders the work of the opposition. For example, death squads have killed members of opposition parties and at times the regime forbids newspapers. Ethnic groups suspect of supporting the opposition are denied citizenship. The hopes for free and fair elections in 2005 are very slim and if at all, could only come through massive international pressure. Freedom house has ranked the political rights of the country to “not free”, a “6” on a scale from 1 to 7 where 7 is most unfree.

 Note on evaluation: In the state failure task force analysis, three values were used on this variable; democratic, partially democratic or autocratic. For a country to be recognized as a partial democracy it should “have a mix of democratic and autocratic institutions, with democratic features outweighing autocratic ones”. In the forum option papers, apart from newly occupied states (Iraq and Afghanistan) and states deemed to have no effective regime (Somalia and Congo-Kinshasa) , 4 states with political rights “7” and 4 with “6” were deemed to be autocratic, and only 1 state, Ethiopia, with political rights “5” were deemed “partial democracy”. Clearly, Côte d’Ivoire is to be defined as autocratic and thus “yes”.

II – Trade openness (No)

The more a country trades the less likely genocide is to occur. Regimes of countries that trade more generally have more to lose by becoming an international pariah and foreign governments care more about what happens there.

 Côte d’Ivoire is the worlds leading cacao producer and trade is what have made the country as relatively wealthy as it is.

 Note on evaluation: In the Stockholm International Forum 2004 option papers[54], states at risk of genocide are categorized to very low, low, medium or high based on the country’ imports+exports/GDP. The countries in the low category (“on”) range from Burundi (26%) to Uganda (39%) and the countries in the medium category (“off”) ranges from Ethiopia (50%) to Algeria (62%). Côte d’Ivoire is even in the high category in this classification, with 78% of GDP, and is clearly not triggering this risk indicator.

III – Ideological character of the ruling elite (Yes)

Not surprisingly, genocides tend to occur in countries where elites espouse a belief system based on some overriding purpose or principle that identifies certain groups as opposing that principle.

 Numerous and strong militias with explicit racist ideology are supported by the regime and trained in weapons use by the presidential security forces (see racist militia). A policy of impunity for the militias’ violence against immigrants and northerners (together these groups are known as the Dioulas) is in effect. Ethnic cleansing of areas leading to thousands and even tens of thousands of refugees has occurred on numerous occasions (see ethnic cleansing). The regime has been conducting a policy of removing tribes from the north, known to support the opposition, from influence. An ideology of extreme nationalism, often called ivoirité (ivorianness) is commonplace in the debates (see ethnicism). Journals close to the government, party in power and the president fuel the hate-rhetoric constantly (see hate-rhetoric).

 Note on evaluation: Côte d’Ivoires ruling elite clearly have an exclusionary ideology, of nationalist kind, and this indicator is “yes”.

IV – Ethnic character of the ruling elite (Yes)

Again, not surprisingly, genocides tend to occur in countries where ethnicity is highly politicized.

 In Côte d’Ivoire ethnicity between northerners and southerners is highly politicized. See the previous indicator.

 Note on evaluation: Of course, as the regime and the powerful militias have an exclusionary ideology, in theory and practice, towards some ethnic groups, ethnicity is highly politicized[55]. In the Stockholm International Forum 2004 option papers this variable is somewhat different from the one in the task force report used here. There the ruling elite has to be politicized and a minority for the indicator to trigger. We use the task force report here[56] but it should nonetheless be mentioned that the ruling elite in the country and the possible target groups are roughly of the same size.

V – Religious diversity (No)

Genocide is more common in countries where most of the population belongs to a single religion (this group tend to become the victimizer, not the victim). It is probably easier to target a relatively small group.

 Côte d’Ivoire has three mayor religions, Muslim, Christian and Indigenous, all of which are of roughly the same size.

 Note on evaluation: The variable is very clearly not triggered. In the Stockholm International Forum 2004 option papers this variable is not present, instead there is a variable called previous genocides (a country is more likely to experience genocide if there has been previous genocides). Côte d’Ivoire has not been going through any previous genocide (though see ethnic cleansing).

VI – Upheaval (Yes(?))

Genocide is much more common in countries where several cases of state failure and civil strife have occurred recently.

 Côte d’Ivoire was quite stable until the death of old dictator Houphoüet-Boigny in 1993. Some incidents occurred under his immediate predecessor and after his fall in a coup 1999 a prolonged crisis has been the state of the country. Another coup 2002 lead to a short civil war, an agreed but largely failed peace process, division of the country for two years and of course many cases of civil strife during the period such as the reign of terror after the 2002 coup, the 120+ killed during the March 25 2004 demonstrations, the attempt to take up arms in November 2004 with the harassment and subsequent evacuation of westerners (see upheaval).

 Note on evaluation: This variable is the sum of the maximum yearly magnitude of a country’s state failure events over the past 15 years. We don’t really know how this is defined. However, in the Stockholm International Forum 2004 option papers, Pakistan and China is defined as Medium and Medium-High respectively, both corresponding to a “Yes” for the upheaval variable. Côte d’Ivoire’s recent history seems to include a lot more strife and state failures than both these countries. Also, this report primarily warns for genocide should the civil war be resumed. Of course, these events would further increase the amount of upheaval in the country’s history.

Discussion on study 2

It’s of course dubious to use a statistical model without having access to the data sets used in the model and hope to evaluate these with accuracy. Being able to compare known risk countries from the model with the country in question only compensates marginally for this major disadvantage.

 In the option papers, countries at risk suffered from having between 3 and 5 of the risk indicators triggered. Côte d’Ivoire seems to have at least 3, probably 4, of these risk indicators triggered and are thus a country at risk. Two additional things should be noted about the model. First, some of the indicators in the real model are continuous and the use of a yes/no approach in the option papers a simplification. This has the greatest implication for the current study for the trade openness indicator that has a value for Côte d’Ivoire that is with a large marginal “safe”. Second, some of the indicators in the real model are more important than the others. Again, this has the greatest implication for the current study for the trade openness indicator that by far has the strongest (inverted) relationship with genocide. Thus according to the model, the country might be a risk country, but it might also be saved from such a status through the fact that the ruling elite have so much to lose on upsetting the world so much, indicated by the importance of trade for the country. It should also be noted that the only indicators that are not triggered are the passive indicators of trade and religious diversity. Every development indicator is either “yes” or “probably yes”. 

 Now, the risk factor model is being able to predict 79% of historical genocides. Now, this is of course a model developed after the factual events. The model can thus be quite fitted to the data rather than being actually very good at predicting genocide (how good it actually is will only be known when it has been prediciting genocide in advance)  Also, it still leaves out 21% of genocides that it would not have predicted had it been used during the time. Clearly, the model is of some, but limited, value. Common sense must also be applied to the situations. We believe that the presence of 150000 militias with racist ideology, weapons training and a history of committing ethnic purges by common sense makes a greater threat than the little part it plays in one out of six of these indicators. And that although the results from the risk factor analysis are not very clear, the risk for genocide in the country could not be neglected based on the results of the model.

Study 3 – Ignored early warnings from Rwanda

The capital failure of the international community in dealing with the genocide in Rwanda has been thoroughly investigated. The present study compares the (ignored) early warning signals that were present before the genocide in Rwanda with what can be seen in reports from Côte d’Ivoire today. The two situations are similar in that both have a peace process going on to solve an earlier civil war and that this is monitored by international peace-keepers. It is different approach from study 2 in that it focuses on how the information appears to the international community.

 The joint evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda synthesis report have a section on what kind of warning signals were available to the international community before the genocide:

 “From 1990 onwards, civil violence against the minority Tutsi community and regime critics gradually escalated. Observers commonly linked the violence to the civil war, either as retaliatory measures or as warnings to the advancing RPF forces. However, two authoritative reports - one by an independent International Commission of Inquiry, and another prepared for the UN Commission on Human Rights - suggested a more radical and comprehensive design that foreshadowed events to come. Both reports determined that the killings were genocidal in nature and that existing authorities were substantially involved. As the war continued and the outlines of a peace formula took shape, additional reports indicated that Hutu extremists were organizing and arming themselves to derail the peace process and massacre "internal enemies". The creation of documented structures of violence (death squads, death lists, and, later, hate propaganda inciting violence) provided warnings of a potential genocide. “

From the above the following warning signals can be extracted:

I – Authorities are involved in small-scale killings of genocidal nature

A murder is genocidal if the victem is killed primarily for belonging to a specific group defined by ethnic or religious tokens. The Ivorian authorities have probably (evidence is hard to obtain due to the nature of the issue at hand) been involved in ethnic killings on a number of occasions (see ethnic killings). More generally, an almost total impunity is in effect towards the militias when they commit atrocities, including murder and ethnic cleansing, against Muslims, immigrants, northerners and opposition members[57].

II – Extremists are organizing and arming themselves to avoid peace and massacre “internal enemies”

The racist militias do get weapons training from the presidential guard, their numbers are steadily increasing and their rhetoric is very aggressive towards their “internal enemies” (see racist militia).

III – Structures of violence such as death squads, death lists and hate propaganda inciting violence are created

There has been much talk about death squads and black lists among the opposition and the Ivorian human rights movement (see death squads)[58]. Hate propaganda against “foreigners” has been quite commonplace in Côte d’Ivoire, in the pro-FPI press as well as in state television and radio broadcasts (see hate-rhetoric).

 *****

Again according to the above mentioned synthesis report a number of additional warnings were present the months before the genocide started:

“In the months immediately preceding the genocide, many additional signs indicated that the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that massive violence was being planned. The air was full of extremist rhetoric on radio, in public rallies and at official cocktail parties. There were assassinations and organized violence. Detailed intelligence reports were passed to New York and the Belgian military authorities by the unofficial UNAMIR intelligence unit documenting the military training of militias, hidden arms caches, and plans for violent action. Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding a planned coup, an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the capital. The cable was placed in a separate Black File, designed to draw attention to its content, and circulated to several departments in the UN Secretariat. However, senior officials in the Secretariat questioned the validity of the information and made no contingency plans for worst-case scenarios. Similar intelligence failures were evident on the state level, particularly in France and Belgium, both of which had a considerable capacity for overt and covert information gathering in Rwanda at the time.”

From the above the following warning signals can be extracted:

IV – Massive extremist rhetoric in the media, at public rallies etc.

As noted in point III above, hate-rhetoric is always present in the country. Of course, whenever something happens, the rhetoric worsens.

V – Assassinations and organized violence

Assassinations targeting the democratic opposition were commonplace in the first period after the coup (see assassinations and death squads). Ordering the militias to violent protests has been a strategy to avoid having to implement the peace accords from day 1 (see organized violence). Another form of organized violence is the ethnic killings and cleansings that has been going on with the quiet consent of, or even cooperation by, the regime (see ethnic killings and ethnic cleansings).

VI – Military training of militias, hidden arms caches and plans for violent action

The militias are trained by the presidential guard and other security forces. Their explicit goals are fighting the rebels and sometimes “cleansing” the country from immigrants (see racist militias). There are most certainly hidden arms of some kind, but no reports on large quantities of hidden weapons exist. 

VII – Warnings for actions to continue the civil war for example an assault on the peace-keepers to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings.

The government has armed since the coup and recently attempted to resume the war (see arming and the whole section “November 2004 – government attempt to restart the war”). No plans to carry out genocidal killings have been revealed to our knowledge.

Discussion on study 3

Rwanda and Côte d’Ivoire are two different countries. Generalizing too much from similarities in the two country’s histories is probably not very wise. Nonetheless, quite a number of the warning signals from Rwanda are present in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, only two of the warning signals are not present – namely detailed plans to carry out genocidal killings and hidden arms caches. Of course, these two warnings are among the last of warnings that will appear before genocide actually takes place. If the history of Rwanda would repeat itself in Côte d’Ivoire, we would now be in the next-to-last phase, between a few months and few years before the genocide starts.

Conclusion

It seems that almost all preconditions for genocide are present. The only ones that is in fact not present is the ones that should be expected immediately before the start of the genocide, such as detailed plans to conduct genocide and the creation of arms caches. Also, preconditions don’t mean action. Some triggering event (such as a renewed war, violence during elections or the assassination of the president) is also necessary to light the fuse.

 However, there are also some restraining factors. First (study 2-V), the victim group is so incredibly numerous (the potential group consists of all immigrants, muslims and northerners and may in fact be the majority of the country’s population) that their cries will be heard a long way. Second (study 2-II), and perhaps more important, the country is so well-integrated in the world economy that many mighty people in the country has a lot to lose from becoming an international pariah.

 A possible trigger for genocide is a successful attempt to restart the war from the southern side. This could lead to a situation where the newly conquered north would be punished for their support to the rebels and/or a situation where the internal “enemies” in the south are suspected of supporting the rebels and killed for this. Another possible trigger is the death, by assassination, coup or natural causes, of president Gbagbo. This could lead to a power-vacuum situation where no one can control the militias and their ideology drives them to continue the process to genocide by the currently controlled inertia of their fear and hate.

Recommendations

Of course, every nation and the international community must work to avoid genocide. We believe a policy to do the best possible to avoid genocide includes the following:

 First, to work to remove the available preconditions. This includes various ways to change the media flow to the population. The UN radio station is an example of what can be done. Applying international pressure on the Gbagbo regime to force it to stop sending xenophobic messages in state media and condemn the hate media publicly could be another good step. It also includes taking powerful steps to counter the existence of the militias. This means applying international pressure on the Gbagbo regime to force it to stop training and financing of militias and to end impunity of militia members. Also, militia members that have not been conducting crimes against humanity should be included in the disarmament programs of the peace talks (so as to not give the whole of the militia community a common goal in destroying peace).

 Second, to work proactively if the aforementioned preconditions should be honoured. That is, giving the UNOCI mandate to search for and destroy rumoured illegal arms caches and if possible the mandate to question and arrest anyone suspected to plan large-scale ethnical killings to stand court nationally or in front of the International Criminal Court.

 Third, to stand extremely firm against possible triggers that could start genocide. This includes working against a renewed war by strengthening the international peace-keeping forces at every aggression towards them or the north. It also includes actual fighting should the south attack, as well as acceptance of losses from possible future assassinations.

 Fourth, to be prepared for a sudden outbreak of genocide. Most importantly, this includes giving the UNOCI mandate to protect civilians outside their areas of deployment. Currently, the mandate only allows for protection of civilians within the troops areas of deployment.

 Fifth, under no circumstances whatsoever apart from a full implementation of the peace agreement should the Gbagbo regime be allowed to take control over the north. In fact, if the situation would deteriorate to the point where the peace-keepers can’t uphold the demilitarized zone because of assassinations or the like, military defence aid must be offered to the north until a new peace process could start.

 Above, what is meant by international pressure includes, but is not limited to:

·         Imposing personal sanctions such as forbidding travels and freezing the international bank accounts of leaders of the Gbagbo regime and known perpetrators.  

·         Freezing all development aid until the human rights conditions improve (most aid has already been frozen)

·         Currently, the leaders of the socialist international proclaims full support for the regime. Instead they should make membership in the international conditional on improvements in the regime behaviour. More specifically this demand is directed to two of the internationals vice-presidents, namely to Tony Blair that recently proclaimed that the international community must be much more active in Africa and to Göran Persson that proclaims he is committed to the prevention of Genocide and that should recognize the threat posed by the regime he is currently supporting.

·         For every nation to offer the UN troops and other resources when requested.